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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 
§ 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Has the Plaintiff properly marshaled the evidence and shown that the 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, provides no basis for 
jury's verdict and that Plaintiff is entitled to a reversal as a matter of law? 
2. Did the trial court judge abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for additur, and motion for new trial, 
i.e. was there no reasonable basis for the jury's verdict, where the jury decided the fact 
issue of what damages were proximately caused by the subject accident, weighing the 
credibility and content of all of the evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. In determining whether a party has adequately marshaled the evidence to 
challenge a jury verdict, the Court must determine whether the appellant has stated "fully 
and accurately all of the evidence on [each] issue and then show[n], as a matter of law, 
that the evidence does not support the verdict" Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 
1998) and that, when "viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict," the evidence to 
support the verdict was "completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make 
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust," kL at 433. 
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2. (a) Denial of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
The standard of review for determining whether a trial court erred in denying a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) is to determine whether any 
competent evidence was presented which would support the verdict because a trial court 
is justified in granting j.n.o.v. only if there is no competent evidence to support the 
verdict. Ricci v. Schoultz. 963 P.2d 784, 785-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
(b) Denial of Motion for New Trial 
Regarding the standard of review for a trial court's decision denying a motion for 
new trial, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
799 (Utah 1991) that, because a trial court has some discretion in deciding whether to 
grant a new trial, an appellate court can reverse "only for an abuse of that discretion." In 
other words, "a trial court's decision to deny a new trial will be upheld if there is a 
reasonable basis to support that decision" and will be reversed "only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision," IdL at 805, i.e., "only if it concludes that the evidence, 
when viewed most favorably for the prevailing party, is insufficient to support the 
verdict" Tingev v. Christensen. 1999 UT 68 H 7; 987 P.2d 588, 590. 
(c) Denial of Motion for Additur 
The denial of a motion for additur is reviewed similar to a denial of a motion for 
new trial. Where Rule 59(a) states that trial courts may grant a new trial for "excessive or 
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice," and the courts recognize therein an implicit authority to order or offer the 
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alternative of an additur (or, conversely, remittitur) instead of a new trial,1 the decision of 
whether or not to grant or offer an additur is discretionary. Therefore, an appellate court 
reviews a trial court's decision relating to additur for an abuse of discretion. If denial of a 
motion for new trial was not an abuse of discretion, then a denial of a motion for additur 
is, similarly, not an abuse of discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civ. P. (2003) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff in this matter, Mr. Nicholas J. Roberts ("Plaintiff Roberts") appeals 
the decisions of the Third District Court denying his motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, additur, and for new trial, asserting that the judge abused his 
discretion and that there was no reasonable basis for the jury's award of damages where 
the damage award failed to match either the amount proposed by Plaintiff or the different 
amounts endorsed by different expert witnesses. Plaintiff asserts that the jury's award was 
"inadequate and erroneous." (PL's brief, p. 11, J^ 2.) Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse, 
and Defendant asks this Court to affirm, the trial court's ruling and the jury's verdict. 
1
 See, e.g.. Bodon v. Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 44; 327 P.2d 826, 828 (Utah 1958) 
and the concurring opinion of J. Worthen, 8 Utah 2d at 48; 327 P.2d at 83. 
3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
This action was commenced by Plaintiff Roberts on March 17, 2004 against 
Defendant Dobson. (R. 2752 at 1-18.) A jury trial was held before Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick of the Third District Court of Salt Lake County on August 23 and 24, 2005. (R. 
275 at 125.) Following testimony on the disputed issue of proximate cause of damages, 
the jury awarded Plaintiff Roberts $1,100.00 in special damages and $200.00 in general 
damages. (R. 275 at pp. 163-64.) Plaintiff Roberts moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, additur, and new trial. (R. 275 at pp. 166-226; PL's Addendum 9.) The trial 
court entered a Judgment on the Jury Verdict on September 20, 2005 (R. 275 at pp. 244-
47; PL's Addendum 10) and a Minute Entry denying Plaintiff Roberts1 motion(s) on 
September 29, 2005 (R. 275 at p. 254-55; PL's Addendum 11.) Plaintiff appealed. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The following are undisputed statements of fact relating to both facts and fact 
disputes, clarifying for the court the evidence on each side of the relevant issues, 
especially where there is conflicting evidence or disputed evidence. 
Prior Accident and Injuries 
Plaintiff Roberts had been involved in a rear-end automobile collision in 1999, 
prior to the rear-end collision that is the subject of this lawsuit. The prior collision was 
similar to the subject accident and had resulted in injuries similar to those complained of 
following the subject accident, including injury to his neck and lower back with pain 
2
 R. 275 is Volume One of the Transcript of the Jury Trial. 
4 
radiating into his leg as well as headaches. (R. 275 at pp. 26:7-16, 30:17-31:2, 51:20-
54:21-23,56:9-17.) 
Plaintiff Roberts had been examined and treated by Dr. Home for the injuries 
caused by the prior accident, and Plaintiff had received a permanent impairment rating of 
14% by Dr. Home for those prior injuries. (R. 275 at pp. 54:24-55:19, 101: 7-12;138:10-
12, 148:20-23; R. 2763 at p. 191:11-25; PL's Addendum 3: Trial exhibit 6.) 
The Subject Accident 
On or about Saturday, May 17, 2003, Plaintiff Roberts was involved in the rear-
end automobile collision that is the subject of this lawsuit when Mr. Roberts' vehicle was 
rear-ended by Defendant Dobson's vehicle after stopping for a red traffic light. (R. 275 at 
pp. 8:15-21, 25:20-23.) Mr. Roberts was driving a 2002 Ford explorer, and Defendant 
Dobson was driving a Ford F-350 long-bed truck pulling a cargo trailer. (R. 275 at p. 
34:20-25.) 
Defendant Dobson testified that, at the scene of the accident, Plaintiff Roberts did 
not appear to be injured. (R. 275 at p. 161:16-22.) Plaintiff Roberts testified that, at the 
scene of the accident and afterwards, he experienced neck and back pain (R. 275 at pp. 
28:25-29:4, 51:10-25, 103:11-19) and that, at some point after the accident, he 
experienced headaches which were different from the headaches he had previously been 
experiencing (R. 275 at pp. 45:23-25, 46:1-9, 82:14-18). 
Immediately following the collision, Plaintiff Roberts called to report the accident 
3
 R. 276 is Volume Two of the Transcript of the Jury Trial. 
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and placed flares in the road to alert traffic of the accident. (R. 275 at p. 28:11-24.) 
Plaintiff Roberts declined to be transported to a medical facility by ambulance but 
was visited and examined at his home by Dr. Jonathan Home, a friend of Mr. Roberts, on 
the day of the accident. (R. 275 at pp. 29:10-18, 30:9-16, 50:23-51:4, 84:21-85:25.) 
Doctors1 Assessments 
Dr. Home administered medication (R. 275 at p. 39:2-7), recommended that 
Plaintiff Roberts take time off from work (R. 275 at p. 39:24-25), and recommended 
physical therapy (R. 275 at 41:19-20). Plaintiff Roberts took time off from work Monday, 
May 19, 2003 through Thursday, May 22, 2003 by using some of his accrued vacation 
time. (R. 275 at pp. 40:1-5, 67: 6-8, 140:18-29.) 
Plaintiff later took additional time off from work to attend two physical therapy 
sessions (R. 275 at 41:21-42:2) and have three MRI scans (R. 275 at 44:20-25) and one or 
more spine injections recommended by Dr. Home (R. 275 at pp. 42:21-43:4, 79:18-19) 
and about ten office visits with Dr. Home (R. 275 at p. 79:9-15). (See also. PL's 
Addendum 5: Trial exhibit 8; Pl.fs Addendum 6: Trial exhibit 9.) Plaintiff testified that he 
was able to alter his work schedule to accommodate some of those treatments and used 
vacation time for some of them and made a claim for lost wages despite the fact that he 
was actually paid and only lost accrued vacation time. (R. 275 at pp. 67:14-68:3, 68: 25-
69:5,79:20-22,80:1-10.) 
Dr. Home testified that Roberts suffered separate or additional injury as a result of 
the subject accident and an "aggravation" of the previous injuries. (R. 275 at p. 104:7-22; 
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R. 276 at p. 195:17-22.) Dr. Home testified that Roberts' injuries from the subject 
accident increased his impairment rating two percent on the cervical spine and lumbar 
spine. (R. 275 at pp. 101:13-19, 139:14-16; PL's Addendum 3: Trial exhibit 6.) 
Expert witness Dr. Scott Knorpp testified, based on his independent medical 
examination, that Roberts complained of having pain but suffered only a temporary 
worsening or "exacerbation" of the preexisting injuries, not an "aggravation," and said he 
found no objectively observable evidence, even in the MRI scans, of any separate injury 
or actual worsening of Plaintiff s spinal anatomy and no permanent disability as a result of 
the 2003 accident. (R. 276 at pp. 205:24-206:14, 212:16-213:16, 222:6-21.) 
Both experts testified that the MRI scans taken after the subject accident actually 
showed there had been an improvement in Plaintiffs lumbar spine compared to MRIs 
taken in 1999. (R. 275 at p. 126:11-21; R. 276 at 200:11-21.) 
While Dr. Knorpp testified that it was reasonable for Roberts to seek medical 
evaluation following the subject accident, he did not attribute all of Roberts1 subsequent 
complaints and treatments to the subject accident. (R. 276 at pp. 209:24-25, 210:1-2, 
212:3-8, 210:7-10, 240:3-19; PL's Addendum 4: Trial exhibit 15.) 
Dr. Knorpp testified that Mr. Roberts met the criteria for a resolved disorder at the 
time he returned to work and suggested that expenses incurred by Plaintiff after October 
1, 2003 were questionable because there was a lack of evidence to support a connection 
to the subject accident (R. 276 at pp. 208:13-209:23, 240:3-19) and that there was no 
objective justification for conducting an MRI of Plaintiffs brain (R. 276 at p. 210:1-6). 
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Dr. Knorpp also testified that Plaintiffs case could be classified as a "nomogenic 
disorder" which he said "reflects] the psychological and the social disposition of the 
patient," involving "delayed recovery syndrome" based on the fact that he claimed he had 
"no improvement since the date of the accident." (R. 276 at pp. 206:15-24.) Dr. Knorpp 
explained that "[tjhat's just not consistent with what we know to be true with musculo-
skeletal injuries and disorders. They all improve. You may not get a hundred percent 
better, but everyone improves. And then you may have a waxing and waning of 
symptoms." (R. 276 at p. 206:15-24.) 
Dr. Knorpp testified that, during examination of Plaintiff, he conducted a series of 
"credibility maneuvers" designed to determine whether a patient is "embellishing, 
augmenting or over-reporting subjective pain complaints" by testing "maneuvers that 
simply can't cause pain." (R. 276 at pp. 180:10-184:1). Dr. Knorpp reported that Plaintiff 
failed five of those tests and endorsed "non-organic symptom descriptors" which "simply 
don't make neuro-anatomical sense." (R. 276 at pp. 184:2-10, 207:2-23). Dr. Knorpp 
indicated that those factors indicate "either intentional or unintentional efforts to advertise 
or embellish their symptoms." (R. 276 at 184:11-15.) 
Stipulations of the Parties 
Defendant stipulated that his negligence was the cause of the accident but disputed 
whether his negligence or the accident proximately caused the injuries and damages 
claimed by Plaintiff. (R. 275 at pp. 7:13-18; R. 276 at 250:6-12.) 
The parties stipulated to the use of exhibits at trial. (R. 275 at pp. 23:12-24:1.) 
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Defendant did not stipulate that the content of Plaintiffs exhibits accurately 
represented the amount of damages attributable to the subject accident. 
The parties stipulated and agreed to the jury instructions used at trial; neither party 
has raised any issue on appeal regarding any jury instruction. (R. at 133-162.) 
It is undisputed that, after the subject accident, Plaintiff Roberts complained of 
neck and back pain and headaches and received medical treatment. However, the parties 
never stipulated that all of Plaintiff s complaints or treatments were related to or caused 
by the subject accident. (R. 275 at p. 7:17-18). 
Determination of Damages 
Plaintiff testified that his claim for lost wages from May 17, 2003 to October 1, 
2003 totaled $1,606.66, based on his calculation of the value of the vacation time he took 
during the first four work days following the subject accident. (R. 275 at pp. 41:6-14, 
67:6-8.) 
Plaintiff testified that the cost of the two physical therapy sessions he attended was 
$158.29. (R. 275 at p. 42:18; PL's Addendum 5: Trial Exhibit 8.) 
Plaintiff testified that the total cost of all of his prescription medications from May 
17, 2003 to January 5, 2005 was $2,932.21 (R. 275 at p. 46:21-22; PL's Addendum 1: 
Trial Exhibit 11) and that the cost of the spinal injections was $767.39 (R. 275 at 43:18-
19). 
Plaintiff indicated that Dr. Home's medical services from May 17, 2003 through 
December 9, 2004 totaled $4,003.00 (R. 275 at p. 47:1-15; PL's Addendum 2). 
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Plaintiff presented evidence that the cost of the three MRIs received was $3,795. 
(R. 275 at 45:1-5; PL's Addendum 6: Trial Exhibit 9.) 
After reviewing all of the evidence, the jury awarded Plaintiff Roberts $1,100.00 
in special damages and $200.00 in general damages. (R. at pp. 163-64; PL's Addendum 
8.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, motion for additur, and motion for new trial for the following 
reasons: 
I. Plaintiff has failed to fully marshal the evidence; he fails to accurately 
recount all of the evidence but limits his recitation of facts to those which support his 
argument, leaving out important evidence that shows a reasonable basis for the jury's 
verdict and the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motions. 
II. Plaintiff ignores the proper role of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
credibility of the evidence, improperly asking this Court to usurp the jury's role. The law 
establishes, and the stipulated jury instructions reflect, that the jury has the right and 
responsibility to consider all of the evidence, including credibility and possible bias, and 
to then determine the appropriate level of damages, if any, that the Plaintiff should 
recover. The jury is not obligated to accept any particular version of the facts presented by 
the witnesses or attorneys and is not required to accept the documentary evidence as being 
entirely attributable to the subject accident where there is a legitimate question as to 
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Plaintiffs preexisting condition and the proximate cause of some or all of the Plaintiffs 
treatments and costs incurred. 
III. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs 
motions where a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict existed. Where the evidence 
included evidence of (a) a prior accident with preexisting injuries of a permanent nature 
which were nearly identical to those Plaintiff attributes to the subject accident, (b) expert 
testimony on the absence of objective data to show actual physical evidence of any 
change in Plaintiffs condition, (c) expert testimony that Plaintiffs examination reflected 
embellishment of Plaintiff s symptoms, and (d) evidence of possible bias in the treatment 
and testimony by Plaintiffs expert, it was reasonable for the jury to reach the conclusion 
that Mr. Dobson's negligence was the proximate cause of only $1,100 worth of special 
damages. Therefore, the trial judge properly concluded that there was a reasonable basis 
for the jury's determination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff has failed to fully marshal the evidence, leaving out evidence 
that shows a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict and for the trial 
court's decision denying Plaintiffs motions. 
Plaintiff has failed to fully marshal the evidence as required. The Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998) that when challenging 
whether the evidence sufficiently supports a verdict, "the one challenging the verdict must 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict" (internal quotation 
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omitted). The Court emphasized that M[i]t is an absolute requirement of marshaling that 
the party state fully and accurately all of the evidence on an issue and then show, as a 
matter of law, that the evidence does not support the verdict." Id at 434 (emphasis 
added). 
Although Plaintiff has recited the evidence in favor of his arguments, he has failed 
to acknowledge and include evidence in favor of the verdict. For example, Plaintiff failed 
to include any mention of Dr. Knorpp's testimony that Plaintiff failed several credibility 
tests during his physical examination and evaluation and that Dr. Knorpp testified 
specifically that Plaintiffs examination did not meet the criteria for "aggravation" of a 
prior injury. Plaintiff also failed to include the fact that Dr. Knorpp testified that the 
objective data showed no negative change in Plaintiffs spinal anatomy after the subject 
accident and that both experts actually observed improvement when comparing the earlier 
MRIs with the 2003 MRIs. The omission of important details (such as those listed here) 
which support the jury's verdict shows that Plaintiffs appeal has not properly marshaled 
the evidence as required. 
II. Plaintiff ignores the role of the jury and improperly asks this Court to 
reweigh the evidence. 
Plaintiffs appeal ignores the dictate articulated by the Utah Supreme Court that "it 
is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
the witnesses." Child, 972 P.2d at 434. The jury has the right and responsibility to weigh 
the evidence and determine the facts based on the credibility of the evidence as well as 
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the content of the evidence. Where facts are disputed, the jury's job is to determine the 
facts. They did so in this case, and their determination to attribute only a portion of the 
damages to the subject accident does not exceed the bounds of their prerogative. As 
I 
explained in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 
(Utah 1985), a jury must have latitude in exercising its judgment in awarding damages 
and is "generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages." The Court also 
explained that !,[w]here evidence is in conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury 
believed those facts that support its verdict." IcL at 1082. 
Plaintiff asserts inaccurately that the relevant facts were not disputed. (See, for 
example, the first sentence of Plaintiff s argument summary: "The clear and undisputed 
evidence at trial was that . . . .") . Contrary to that assertion, the evidence regarding the 
cause of Plaintiff Roberts' injuries is disputed. While it is undisputed that Defendant 
Roberts was negligent in his driving, it is disputed that the resulting accident caused any 
of Plaintiff Roberts' damages. Where Plaintiff had been in a prior auto accident with 
identical injuries and treatment, the evidence does not conclusively show that Plaintiff 
Robert's claimed damages were a result of the subject incident. This point was expressly 
made clear numerous times during the trial and in the jury instructions. Yet now, Plaintiff 
claims that there was no dispute, therefore the jury was obligated to accept a particular 
version of the facts. 
Additionally, Plaintiff suggests, wrongly, that because Defendant stipulated to 
Plaintiffs use of exhibits regarding treatment and expenses that meant Plaintiff somehow 
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was stipulating that those exhibits accurately represented the treatment and expenses 
attributable to the subject accident. There is no basis for such a claim. Plaintiff appears to 
confuse two important distinctions regarding the stipulations made by the parties: First, as 
already explained, Defendant stipulated to the fact that his negligence caused the 
accident, Defendant did not stipulate that his negligence proximately caused any of the 
damages claimed by Plaintiff. Second, Defendant stipulated to allow Plaintiff to use 
exhibits showing the medical treatments received by Plaintiff and the costs incurred for 
those treatments; Defendant did not stipulate that any of the treatments and costs shown 
in those exhibits were proximately caused by Defendant's negligence. 
Furthermore, the fact that Dr. Knorpp identified a specific time period after which 
treatments and costs were either unrelated to or not caused by the subject accident does 
not mean that Defendant has stipulated that any treatments and costs prior to that time 
were proximately caused by the subject accident; that is the jury's determination to make. 
Plaintiff suggests that the jury must accept the recommendations of either one or the other 
doctors who testified at trial; however, that is untrue. (See the judge's instructions to the 
jury at R. 276 at 248:3-14, 248:21-24, 249:7-15.) Where Plaintiffs doctor endorsed 
recovery of Plaintiff s full treatment and expenses and the independent doctor retained by 
Defendant testified that a portion of that may have been reasonably incurred, Plaintiff 
appears to think that the jury was bound to award at least the amount that Defendant's 
doctor opined was reasonable. Plaintiff does not, however, cite any law supporting such 
an assertion. The law cited in this brief, e.g. Child, 972 P.2d at 434, shows that as long as 
14 
there was some evidence supporting the jury's verdict-and the trial court properly found 
that there was-then the verdict should stand. The courts have recognized and admonished 
appellants that the appellate court does not reweigh fact issues, especially where 
credibility is a significant factor. 
III. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs 
motions where the evidence clearly provided a reasonable basis for the 
jury's verdict. 
The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for additur, and motion for new trial 
because a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict existed. Although the parties had 
stipulated to the fact that Defendant's negligence caused the accident, the jury had to 
determine the extent of damages proximately caused by the accident.4 The jury listened to 
testimony from Plaintiff, Defendant, Plaintiffs doctor who is also his personal friend, and 
testimony from the doctor Defendant hired to perform an independent medical evaluation. 
The jury also reviewed documentary evidence including doctors' statements, medical 
bills, medical records including MRI films, and evidence regarding the damage to the 
vehicles. 
After listening to the testimony and being presented with numerous exhibits, the 
jury was asked to weigh the testimony and documentary evidence and decide the facts 
4
 The parties also stipulated to the use of the trial exhibits and stipulated that 
Plaintiff had actually received the treatments stated and that the costs of that treatment 
were reasonable for the type of treatment given. Again, the issue disputed by the parties 
was whether any of the treatments and costs were proximately caused by the subject 
accident. 
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regarding which damages, if any, were proximately caused by the subject accident. 
Although, in this case, the jury's verdict awarded damages in a lower amount than 
Plaintiff sought and lower than the different opinions presented by the doctors, there was 
more than adequate evidence to support the verdict. Such evidence included evidence of 
(a) a prior accident with preexisting injuries of a permanent nature which were identical 
to those Plaintiff attributes to the subject accident, (b) expert testimony on the absence of 
objective data to show actual physical evidence of any change in Plaintiffs condition, (c) 
expert testimony suggesting embellishment of symptoms, and (d) evidence of possible 
bias in the treatment and testimony by Plaintiffs expert. As stated above, the jury has 
wide discretion in assessing damages, Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083-84 and, "[w]here 
evidence is in conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury believed those facts that 
support its verdict," Id, at 1082. It is certainly possible that a jury could reasonably 
believe that none of the treatment and expenses presented were proximately caused by 
the subject accident. Instead, after careful consideration and deliberation, the jury found 
that $1,100 of medical expenses was incurred as a result of the subject accident. 
Therefore, the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Plaintiffs motions. 
The facts of this case bear a striking resemblance to those in the case of Tingey v. 
Christensen. 1999 UT 68, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999) in which the district court denied the 
plaintiffs motion for a new trial. In Tingey, the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident. IdL ^  2. Similar to this case, "[t]he parties 
stipulated that Tingey received reasonable and necessary medical expenses of $33,669.34 
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after the accident, although they did not stipulate that such costs arose as a result of the 
accident." Id. f^ 4. Furthermore, the defendant in that case also conceded that she 
negligently caused the accident. Id. After considering the evidence, including evidence of 
preexisting injuries, the jury returned a verdict for Tingey in the amount of $1,459.52: an 
amount substantially smaller than that demonstrated by the stipulated trial exhibits. See 
icL Tf 5. In support of her motion for a new trial, Tingey argued that the damages were 
inadequate and there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict. Id ^ 6. However, the 
court disagreed with Tingey and determined that the evidence was sufficient to support 
such a low verdict because the jury could have reasonably concluded that the accident 
giving rise to the case was "not the sole or aggravating factor which caused" her injuries. 
LLH9. 
In this case, Mr. Roberts has not made any arguments that differ from the 
arguments made in Tingey. Mr. Roberts complains that the damages were inadequate 
because the parties stipulated tot he admission of several trial exhibits. Mr. Roberts also 
complains that Mr. Dobson conceded his negligence. However, like the Tingey plaintiff, 
Mr. Roberts also had preexisting conditions, and it was reasonable for the jury to 
conclude that the May 17, 2003 accident was not the sole or aggravating factor which 
caused Mr. Roberts' injuries. Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded, as 
Dr. Knorpp did, that no objective evidence showed any actual physiological injury caused 
by the subject accident and that Mr. Roberts appeared to be embellishing his complaints 
of pain. In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Therefore, the 
17 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on evidence of a prior accident with similar injuries, expert testimony that 
objective data showing an absence of any actual physical change in Plaintiffs pre-existing 
condition, and other evidence regarding credibility and potential bias, it is clear that a 
reasonable basis existed for the jury's verdict and damage award. Thus, the trial court did 
not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, motion for additur, and motion for new trial. This Court should therefore 
affirm the trial courts's denial of Plaintiff s motions. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2006. 
STRONG & HANNL 
istin A. VanOrman 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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